will enable Russia to export piped gas to China from
the Irkutsk and Yakutia gas production centres passing
through the existing pipelines in eastern Siberia to reach
both Russia’s Port of Vladivostok and China.
The Gazprom and CNPC JV has two segments. The
construction of its first segment (3200 km Yakutia-
Khabarovsk-Vladivostok Line) began on 1 September
2014 in Yakutsk, the capital of Russia’s Sakha (Yakutia)
Republic, which is set to go online in late 2017 as
planned. The construction date of its second segment
(800 km Irkutsk Region-Yakutia) has yet to be decided.
As a CNPC undertaking, construction of the Chinese
part’s started on 30 June 2015 near the Chinese city
of Heihe, in the northern province of Heilongjiang
bordering Russia. The project, on which Beijing will
reportedly spend US$20 billion, consists of northern,
southern and central sections passing through six
Chinese provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Hebei,
Shandong and Jiangsu), the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, Tianjin and Shanghai.
On 17 December 2015, Gazprom and CNPC signed
an agreement to design and construct the Power of
Siberia’s cross-border section, including its submerged
section under the Amur River.
China will start receiving Russian gas upon the
scheduled completion of the entire East Route gas
pipeline in 2018.
Nord Stream II
Nord Stream II is still on track for construction according
to Gazprom, despite cancelling certain tenders for
domestic contracts in December 2015 and January 2016.
Reportedly, the cancelled work includes four tenders for
constructing over 400 km of a trunkline (Ukhta-Torzhok 2
pipeline; approximately 970 km) to feed more gas into the
Nord Stream pipeline system: its first joint was officially
welded in Ukhta on 27 October 2015. With reported
values ranging from US$170 - 220 million, Gazprom has
stressed that the cancellations will have no impact on the
Nord Stream II timeline, including completion by the end
of 2019.
Austria’s OMV, along with other major European
energy companies (Germany’s E.ON and BASF/
Wintershall, France’s ENGIE and Royal Dutch Shell),
signed an agreement with Gazprom in Vladivostok
on 4 September 2015 to double the current capacity
(55 billion m
3
/y) of the Nord Stream gas pipeline
through construction of a new pipeline system by 2019.
The Nord Stream II will export 55 billion m
3
/y of
Russian gas to Germany via twin offshore pipelines (each
27.5 billon m
3
/y; 1200 km) through the Baltic Sea. This
is the undertaking of New European Pipeline AG’s JV, in
which Gazprom is the largest shareholder (51%) while
others, excluding ENGIE (9%), have a share of 10% each.
The pipeline seems to run against the EU’s energy and
political objectives and plans towards Russia, reversing
Brussels’ policy of decreasing the EU’s dependency on
Russia by consolidating and expanding Russia’s supplying
role in the EU gas market.
The planed doubling of Russian gas supplies to the
EU also questions the necessity of building the Trans
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), scheduled to begin in 2016. By
enabling Russia to completely bypass Ukraine for gas
exports to the EU, if it so decides, the project will
weaken the EU’s policy of supporting Ukraine in its
territorial disputes with Russia, for which Brussels has
imposed sanctions on Russia.
The Turkish Stream gas pipeline
The fate of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline is uncertain
because of deteriorating Russian-Turkish relations
since last November, pitting the previously close
energy partners against each other. As the gap between
their opposing policies towards Syria is widening, the
mentioned shooting down of the Russian military aircraft
has seemingly weakened Moscow’s enthusiasm for
making the Turkish Stream a reality.
Given this situation, its intended completion in
December 2016 seems unrealistic. In fact, the worsening
of Russian-Turkish relations has cast doubts about
its construction at all. Last December, Russian Energy
Minister Alexander Novak announced a suspension
of all negotiations over the Turkish Stream pipeline.
Reportedly, Russia has also suspended preparatory work
on the project.
The Turkish Stream emerged last year as a
replacement for the South Stream pipeline. Following
the latter’s cancellation, Gazprom’s Chairman
Alexey Miller and Turkey’s Botas Petroleum Pipeline
Corporation’s Chairman Mehmet Konuk signed a
Memorandum of Intent for its construction in the same
month to help Russia increase gas exports to the EU
without requiring Brussels’ approval.
However, the conclusion of the Nord Stream II’s
agreement prompted Gazprom in October 2015 to
reduce Turkish Stream’s capacity from 63 billion m
3
/y to
32 billion m
3
/y of which half would be for Turkey and the
rest for export to the EU region through neighbouring Greece.
Using the idle South Stream pipeline allocated
resources, the estimated US$12.5 billion Turkish Stream
will run across the Black Sea from the currently under-
construction Russkaya compressor station near Anapa,
on the Black Sea’s northern coast, in Russia’s Krasnodar
Territory to Kiyikoy village in Turkey’s European region.
It will travel further, via Luleburgaz (the delivery
point for the Turkish customers) to the Ipsala border
checkpoint on the Turkish-Greek border – the delivery
point for the European customers.
The pipeline system, consisting of four offshore
strings (each 910 km), will pass 660 km under the Black
Sea within the South Stream pipeline’s decided corridor,
followed by 250 km within a new corridor towards
the Turkish European area. The Turkish onshore line is
reportedly 180 km, while that of Greece is unknown.
16
World Pipelines
/
MARCH 2016
